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Key Points:
•	 The level of harm is more important than the size of the market.
•	 Visible, open air drug markets tend to be more harmful per unit of use than hidden, closed 
drug markets
•	 Policing tactics that are not experienced by the community as being fair, lawful and effective 
will harm police legitimacy and community relations.
•	 Some enforcement-led approaches, including short-term crackdowns and large scale stop 
and search, are unlikely to produce sustainable reductions in drug sales. They may increase 
levels of violence and health harms and reduce police legitimacy.
•	 It is rarely possible to eliminate retail drug markets, but well designed and implemented 
policing tactics can force the drug market to take less harmful forms.
•	 Applying harm reduction principles to drug policing may boost police legitimacy as well as 
community safety.
•	 Focused deterrence and ‘pulling levers’ may reduce both harm and crime, but this depends 
on the context and on careful implementation and evaluation.
∗ University of Kent
Introduction
The policing of drug markets is usually 
conceptualised primarily as a matter of law 
enforcement – drug dealers and people who 
use drugs (PWUDs) are breaking the law, 
and the role of the police is to reduce such 
law breaking. However, the wider purpose 
of policing is to ensure the safety of the 
community by reducing harms to its members. 
This report examines the interaction between 
law enforcement and harm reduction in the 
policing of retail level drug markets.
Harm reduction is a principle that has been 
widely accepted as an important pillar of the 
health policy response to drug use.1 It has less 
frequently been applied to policing, although 
2The first step in applying harm reduction 
principles is to define the harms that are to be 
targeted; in this case the harms associated 
with retail drug markets. Here, we can lean 
on the work that has already been done in this 
area by Caulkins and Reuter.4 They themselves 
borrow the list of drug-related harms created by 
MacCoun and Reuter5 and highlight those that 
are most directly relevant to policing (See Box 1).
Box 1. Drug related harms (Bold typeface indicates those most directly related to policing)
1. Suffering due to physical/mental illnesses
2. Addiction
3. Healthcare costs (treatment)
4. Healthcare costs (illness)
5. Disease transmission
6. Loss of incentives to seek treatment
7. Restriction on medicinal uses of drug
8. Reduced performance, school
9. Reduced performance, workplace
10. Poor parenting, child abuse
11. Harmful effects of stigma due to use
12. Accruing criminal experience
13. Elevated price of substance
14. Accident victimisation
15. Fear, sense of disorder
16. Property/acquisitive crime victimisation
17. Violence, psychopharmacological
18. Violence, economically motivated
19. Reduced property values near markets
20. Criminal justice costs (including opportunity costs)
21. Punishment and its consequences for user and family
22. Corruption, demoralisation of legal authorities
23. Interference in source countries
24. Violation of the law as intrinsic harm
25. Devaluation of arrest as moral sanction
26. Infringement on liberty and privacy
27. Prevention/restriction of benefits of use
this is not the first report to do so.2 Harm 
reduction can be justified on both pragmatic and 
ethical grounds. Pragmatically, it emphasises 
a concern for what actually works in reducing 
harms, rather than for what might be hoped to 
work in eliminating drug use. Ethically, it reflects 
the emphasis of both international human rights 
treaties and rationalist morality3 on the legal and 
moral imperative for states to act in ways that 
support human rights. 
3It should be noted that these harms can be 
influenced in both directions by policing 
practices. For example, decisions on police 
tactics will most probably affect the costs that 
the criminal justice system imposes on the 
taxpayer. This is not only because of the upfront 
costs of targeting police resources on drug 
markets, but also on the ‘downstream’ costs that 
arrest and prosecution may impose on courts, 
prisons and probation services. Less directly, 
certain forms of policing may increase rather 
than reduce opportunities and incentives for 
violence, corruption, unsafe drug use practices 
(e.g. injecting heroin with used needles). While 
frequent, visible search and arrest of PWUDs 
might have some effects in deterring drug use 
and related harms, it may also infringe on the 
rights to health, liberty and privacy and devalue 
arrest as a moral sanction for other offences 
which may be seen as more serious by some 
members of the community.
Policing of drug markets also plays an important 
part in boosting or harming the legitimacy of 
the police. The concept of legitimacy echoes 
the ‘Peelian idea’ that the police should be 
embedded in networks of cooperation with 
the communities they serve. The police need 
information from the community in order 
to detect crime. Perhaps more importantly 
(and certainly according to Sir Robert Peel’s 
legendary policing principles) they seek to 
achieve compliance with the law without 
the need for detection and punishment, by 
securing the absence of crime. But in order to 
do this, they need to be viewed as legitimate 
by the community.6 According to Bottoms 
and Tankebe, this legitimacy rests on three 
elements: procedural fairness, lawfulness, and 
effectiveness.  Procedural fairness arises when 
people are confident in the impartiality of the 
police and when they are treated with dignity 
and respect. Lawfulness requires that the police 
themselves act legally. And effectiveness refers 
to the outcomes of police actions; do people feel 
that they are being protected from crime? This 
report shares the assumption of Felbab-Brown 
that state interventions in drug markets must be 
seen to be legitimate if they are to be effective.7 
Interventions that are not seen as legitimate are 
likely to increase tensions between police and 
citizens, reduce the flow of intelligence that the 
police can use and increase resistance to police 
actions. This leads to lower levels of community 
safety and an increased risk of crime. Bottoms 
and Tankebe also refer to the potential for 
police action to generate legitimacy. The police 
can boost their reputation with the community 
by carrying out operations that are perceived as 
fair, lawful and effective.8 
This report discusses some forms of policing 
that produce harms, including harms to police 
legitimacy. It goes on to look at policing tactics 
that have been designed explicitly to reduce 
harm, and the evidence for their effects and 
sustainability. It examines some issues in 
the implementation and evaluation of such 
practices in the UK and Brazilian contexts. 
It concludes with a set of recommendations 
for consideration by policy makers and senior 
police officers when they are designing policing 
methods in order to reduce harms related to 
retail drug markets. 
Harmful drug law enforcement
There are three main forms of harm that may 
render policing tactics counter-productive. Police 
activities may increase violence associated with 
drug markets, increase health harms related to 
drug use and reduce police legitimacy (which 
may in turn increase criminality). 
Policing and violence
We should first address the issue of whether 
retail drug markets are inherently violent. If 
all drug markets are equally violent then their 
reduction or elimination would properly be the 
target of policing. But if some market forms 
are more violent than others, then the police 
4can enhance community safety by encouraging 
markets to take less violent forms. In the most 
frequently cited article on drugs and crime, 
Goldstein9 assumed that illicit drug markets are 
indeed inherently violent. Goldstein’s concept of 
‘systemic’ violence assumes that the presence 
of drug dealers who are predisposed to violence, 
combined with an absence of legitimate 
mechanisms for conflict resolution, produces 
high levels of violence. While it is true that some 
drug markets in some places are exceedingly 
violent, this is the exception rather than the rule. 
Goldstein’s testing of his framework occurred 
near the peak of violence related to the New 
York crack market.10 Research from some other 
markets – including markets for both heroin and 
cannabis – suggests a much lower prevalence of 
violence.11 Not all drug dealers are predisposed 
to violence. Many of them actively avoid it. 
Instead, they use relations of trust and the 
norms of reciprocity that develop in markets for 
both licit and illicit products.12 
As Felbab Brown notes in Report two of 
this series, Focused deterrence, selective 
targeting, drug trafficking and organized crime: 
Concepts and practicalities, a stable wholesale 
or trafficking operation can be non-violent. 
But perturbation of this stability can lead to 
violence.13 Bowling bases his claim that drug 
law enforcement is criminogenic on evidence 
from the Caribbean where arrests in mid-level 
drug markets, through the arrest of key market 
players, has led to violence as subordinates and 
competitors fight over who will fill the gap that 
has been left in the market. Recent evidence from 
Denmark has found a significant association 
between increased arrests of cannabis dealers 
and subsequent increases in violence.  This 
supports earlier US research in suggesting that 
law enforcement in retail level cannabis markets 
can also increase violence. The most thorough 
review that has so far been carried out on this 
topic is that by Werb et al.14 Of the 15 studies 
that they reviewed, 14 found an association 
between drug law enforcement and increased 
levels of violence. It should, however, be noted 
that the method of comparison adopted did not 
allow for thorough consideration of the types of 
drug law enforcement that were being tested. It 
is no doubt possible, as seen below, to design 
policing interventions that reduce both drug 
transactions and violence.
The studies referred to above looked at the effect 
of increasing law enforcement interventions in 
drug markets. Studies which look at the effect of 
reducing levels of drug law enforcement are less 
common. At the national level, the experience 
of Portugal suggests no consistent link between 
drug decriminalisation and violence (murders 
did increase in the years immediately following 
decriminalisation, but then reduced to their pre-
2001 level. Any increase may have been more 
to do with increased drug seizures at the level of 
importation than to the relaxing of punishment 
of drug consumers).15 
At the local level, we do have the experience of 
the Lambeth Cannabis Warning Scheme. This 
saw police officers being told not to arrest people 
for possession of small amounts of cannabis in 
an area of South London for 12 months from July 
2001. The justification given for this was that it 
would allow the police to focus their resources 
on crimes which the local community were more 
concerned about, such as robbery, burglary, 
sexual offences and class A drug offences (e.g. 
heroin and cocaine). An econometric study has 
found that, when compared to other London 
boroughs, the Lambeth cannabis experiment 
was associated with medium term reductions 
in non-drug crimes and with increases in their 
clear-up rates.16 This is despite the findings 
that recorded cannabis offences increased (this 
may have been because officers increased their 
recorded detection of these offences when 
it meant giving a warning rather than a more 
time-consuming arrest). There was little, if any, 
apparent effect on class A drug crimes. The 
Lambeth scheme has been replicated in various 
forms across England and Wales since 2004 
with the national use of the cannabis warning. 
Unfortunately, this replication was not designed 
5with evaluation in mind and the effects on non-
drug crimes are unknown. The available data do 
suggest that the prevalence of both cannabis 
use and violence has fallen since 2004.17
Policing and health
Evidence on the health effects of drug policing 
strategies is less frequently taken into account, 
despite proposals to include the effects of law 
enforcement in public health strategies on HIV 
and AIDS.18 Generally, prohibition of drugs 
increases their price, which can encourage users 
to inject (rather than smoke or snort) in order to 
maximise their intake from a limited supply. The 
transition to injection is itself associated with 
major health risks internationally.19 At least one 
country – the Netherlands – which has reduced 
the punitiveness of its response to PWUDs 
has seen important successes in reducing the 
rate of injecting drug use.20 Some studies have 
found that local policing tactics can contribute 
to increased health risks for PWUDs. For 
example, the criminalisation of drug possession 
encourages people who inject drugs (PWIDs) 
to inject hurriedly in unsafe environments, 
thereby increasing risks of transmitting blood-
borne viruses.21 Any short-term reductions in 
drug sales brought about by police crackdowns 
may be outweighed by consequent public 
health harms.22 The criminalisation of the 
distribution of injecting paraphernalia leads to 
lower coverage for harm reduction measures 
such as needle exchange.23 And lower coverage 
by needle exchange is associated with higher 
rates of HIV among PWIDs.24 Another health 
risk associated with drug use is overdose. This 
is usually not fatal when there is a suitable 
emergency response, but fear of arrest makes 
many people who witness an overdose less 
likely to seek medical assistance.25 Overall, 
the policing response to PWUDs must be 
considered as part of the ‘risk environment’ of 
drug use.26 Issues relating specifically to PWIDs 
are discussed in Report 1 of this series.27
Police legitimacy
Beyond harms of violence, virus transmission 
and untimely death, policing tactics will 
also affect levels of police legitimacy. One 
widespread approach in drug policing which 
threatens legitimacy is stop and search 
(known as ‘stop and frisk’ in the USA). This is 
supposed to enable police officers to detect 
offenders, producing evidence for arrest and 
prosecution and deterring would-be offenders 
from carrying both drugs and weapons. It is 
also open to widespread abuse. One of the 
main problems has been the disproportionate 
use of stop and search on young people of 
black and minority ethnic origin. The overuse 
of stop and search was notoriously linked 
to the eruption of the Brixton riots in 1981.28 
It has also been blamed by some – though 
not all – commentators for the more recent 
outbreak of rioting in some English cities in the 
summer of 2011.29 In New York, despite the 
fact that possession of marijuana was officially 
decriminalised in the late 1970s, it is still used 
as a pretext for a very large proportion of stops, 
which are overwhelmingly targeted at people 
who are not of white European descent.30 There 
have been discussions as to whether the over-
representation of black people in such figures 
(both in the UK and USA) can be explained by 
the over-representation of black people on the 
streets where police activities are targeted, 
rather than by any racist purpose.31 These 
statistical disputes are likely to be of little import 
to the people who accurately perceive that it is 
they and people who share their skin tone who 
are most frequently stopped and searched. 
In terms of legitimacy, stop and search challenges 
standards of procedural fairness. If people feel 
that they are being picked on for no adequate 
reason and are not treated respectfully in the 
process, then their perception will be that there 
is no justice for them. Some elements of stop and 
search can also be illegal. For example, a Federal 
District Court recently ruled that a policy in New 
York of routinely stopping and frisking people 
at residential properties (known as the ‘Clean 
6Halls’ programme) was unconstitutional.32 The 
flexibility of the term ‘reasonable suspicion’ – 
which is used in several jurisdictions (including 
in section 23 of the British Misuse of Drugs Act) 
as a pre-condition of stop and search – means 
that police officers often bend the term beyond 
reason to continue stopping those whom they 
consider to pose a risk to the community. This 
can also be illegal, and therefore undermine 
the legitimacy of police action. The question of 
effectiveness of stop and search is vexed. High 
quality research designs are rare in this area, 
but a British Home Office review found that 
stop and search played a negligible role in crime 
reduction, reducing the number of ‘disruptable’ 
crimes by just 0.2 per cent.33 
Another important threat to the legitimacy of the 
police is the presence of corruption. The huge 
profits that are made in the illicit drugs trade 
present incentives for corruption at every part 
of the supply chain from farmer to consumer. 
In retail drug markets, corruption may take the 
form of police officers being paid to provide 
intelligence to drug dealers (e.g. tip offs about 
forthcoming police operations), planting drugs 
on members of the public in order to justify 
arrest, diverting cash found on drug dealers to 
their own pockets and even direct involvement 
by police officers in the sale of confiscated 
drugs. Given that these forms of corruption 
are most visible to people who are already 
involved in drug offences, they are highly 
likely to damage the legitimacy of the police in 
their eyes and therefore to encourage them to 
maintain and develop their offending. When this 
corruption is made open to public view by court 
cases and press reports, it severely damages 
police legitimacy in the eyes of the whole 
community. The reduction of opportunities for 
police corruption can therefore also contribute 
to crime and harm minimisation.
Opportunities for harm 
reduction in policing retail drug 
markets
This section will look at approaches for dealing 
with two potential target groups for police action 
– PWUDs and drug sellers.
People who use drugs
The most direct way in which the police can 
reduce harm is to stop imposing criminal records 
and other punishments which harm people. In 
the vast majority of minor drug offences that 
are committed (i.e. simple possession of small 
amounts of cannabis) the criminal record is likely 
to cause more harm to the person than their drug 
use, even when accounting for an increased risk 
of psychosis among some of these people.34 
The internationally available evidence suggests 
that the harms of criminalising PWUDs are not 
counterbalanced by reductions in drug use. 
There is no correlation internationally between 
levels of punishment and levels of drug use.35 
Among European countries which changed 
their penalties for cannabis in the first decade of 
this century, there was no consistent association 
between reductions in penalties and increases 
in use (or between increases in penalties and 
reductions in use).36 
There are diverse ways in which the police can 
avoid criminalising people who are found in 
illicit possession of drugs.37 One is the English 
cannabis warning scheme that is discussed 
above. Other countries, including Portugal 
and various Australian states, have introduced 
mechanisms of diversion to non-criminal 
penalties.38 In some countries – including 
Colombia, Spain and Germany – the courts 
have ruled that it is unconstitutional to punish 
people for possessing small amounts of some 
drugs. All these methods reduce the extent 
of harm that is imposed by criminalisation, 
although they can result in so-called ‘net-
widening’ (See Box 2) and do not guarantee 
that these reductions are applied equally across 
7groups within society that are using drugs. It 
has been reported, for example, that people 
who use drugs from economically vulnerable 
communities in Colombia are still exposed to 
criminalisation and incarceration more often 
than their wealthier peers.39 
The most famous example of the reduction 
of penalties for drug possession comes 
from the Netherlands, where – since 1976 – 
prosecutors and the police have agreed not to 
pursue PWUDs (and dealers) for possession 
of small quantities of cannabis. Since then, it 
has been possible for people to go to coffee 
shops where it is legal to use cannabis. This 
appears to have succeeded in separating the 
markets for cannabis and those for heroin and 
cocaine, thereby reducing the ‘supply gateway’ 
from cannabis to more harmful substances.42 
Recently, the Dutch government attempted, in 
the face of opposition from several municipal 
authorities, to impose controls on who would be 
allowed to buy cannabis in coffee shops. The fall 
of this government in 2012 ended the attempt 
to force all potential purchasers to register to 
receive a ‘wietpas’. Some municipalities (holding 
Box 2. Diversion, net-widening and boundary blurring
While decriminalisation and diversion can play a valuable role in reducing the harms of 
criminalisation, there is also the possibility of ‘net-widening’ and ‘boundary blurring’.40 Net-
widening occurs when an alternative measure is created – usually with the intention of 
reducing the use of expensive, punitive penal responses – which results in practice in sucking 
in new people, rather than replacing the original measure. Boundary blurring occurs when the 
new measure makes it more difficult to tell where the penal system ends and the treatment 
or educative response begins.
The English cannabis warning system has created a clear example of net-widening. 
Immediately after the introduction of the cannabis warning in 2004, there was a significant 
reduction in the number of people who were arrested and given cautions or convictions for 
cannabis possession. But a much greater increase in the number of cannabis warnings were 
given. This led to a significant increase in the number of drug offences and seizures that were 
recorded. Since the late 2000s, there has been a re-growth in the number of people given 
criminal records through cautions and convictions for cannabis possession (following the 
common pattern of maintenance or re-growth of penal responses following the creation of 
alternatives). The net result has been a significant expansion in the number of people getting 
some sort of criminal justice intervention for cannabis use, despite a reduction in the number 
of people using cannabis. 
There have also been some significant examples of net-widening in Australia. For example, 
the South Australian Cannabis Notice Expiation Scheme saw a 280 per cent increase in the 
number of notices given between 1987/8 and 1996/7.41 Such expansion can have the effect 
of increasing demand on the educational and treatment services to which PWUDs may be 
diverted. It can also blur the boundary between criminal justice and other services. Health 
services may find it wasteful of their resources to spend time dealing with low level cannabis 
offenders when they would prefer to focus their resources on people with more harmful 
patterns of drug use.
8a minority of the coffee shops) are going ahead 
with the banning of foreigners from using the 
coffee shops, with early reports that this has led 
to rekindling unregulated open air street drug 
markets in these cities. 
Drug sellers 
The coffee shop system has been credited with 
improving the regulation of retail drug sales in 
the Netherlands, especially since tighter controls 
and enforcement (e.g. banning advertising and 
limiting amounts of drugs to be stored and sold) 
were introduced in the mid-1990s.43 Violence 
in the retail side of the Dutch cannabis market 
is relatively rare, especially when compared to 
some American drug markets. 
Levels of violence that have been associated with 
drug sales in some cities of both hemispheres 
of the American continent have fluctuated 
wildly over the years. The best known example 
is again provided by New York. Ric Curtis and 
Travis Wendel44 have been following these 
developments for many years. They have shown 
how specific types of markets are associated 
with different types and levels of violence, and 
that police activities can influence what form 
the market takes. In the 1980s, drug-selling 
operations that had corporate characteristics 
took control of drug sales. They had hierarchical 
structures, internal divisions of labour (including 
the hiring of violent enforcers) and tended 
to control discrete drug selling territories. 
Intelligence-led policing took down many of 
these organisations, and their territories were 
displaced by a gentrifying housing market. 
The drugs market shifted to a looser collection 
of freelance retailers, all of them competing 
for territory and customers. Not only did the 
dealers fight for these profitable assets, they 
were prey to robbery and violence from some 
of the enforcers who had previously been on the 
more stable payroll of hierarchical gangs. Police 
targeting of these street corner entrepreneurs 
(and the development of mobile phone 
technology) then incentivised and enabled the 
development of a third kind of market; indoor 
sales by delivery. These sellers had no physical 
territory to protect. For them, violence served 
only to draw the attention of the police. So they 
avoided it. This model also had the benefit of 
reducing the presence of visible, open air drug 
markets. Such markets host a multitude of 
‘signal crimes’45 which may also delegitimise 
the police and encourage other offending. In 
terms of harm reduction, hidden indoor sales by 
delivery are much less likely to be harmful, per 
unit sold, than visible, open air drug sales.
Another reported example of success in reducing 
the violence related to drug markets has come 
from High Point, North Carolina. The ‘drug 
market intervention’ here involved ‘creating 
swift and certain consequences by “banking” 
existing drug cases; addressing racial conflict 
between communities and law enforcement, 
setting strong community and family standards 
against dealing; involving dealers’ family 
members, and offering education, job training, 
job placement, and other social services’.46 
The ‘banking’ of drug cases involved collecting 
sufficient evidence to prosecute dealers, and 
then showing them the evidence in order to 
convince them that any continuation of their 
activities would certainly lead to incarceration. 
The evaluators reported that this led to the 
closure of the targeted open air drug markets, 
and to a reduction of violence in these areas. 
This approach of ‘pulling levers’ is an example of 
‘targeted’ or ‘focused’ deterrence, as discussed 
in Report 2 of this series.47 Kleiman argues that 
appropriately targeted and credible threats of 
swift punishment can lead to reductions in crime 
that reduce the need for actual punishment to 
be inflicted. So they can reduce the harms and 
costs of arrest and incarceration, as well as the 
prevalence of crime. This is surely the holy grail 
of drug policing, but some caution is warranted 
on claims that this grail has been found.
A more recent article on High Point has noted that 
evidence is available to support both proponents 
and critics of this approach.48 There was a 
9significant reduction in violence in the targeted 
areas, but there was also an increase in violence 
across the city after the intervention. In addition, 
the reductions were only seen in the areas that 
had the highest levels of chronic violence. They 
were not achieved in drug markets with lower 
levels of violence. This echoes the pattern of 
reception of the ‘Boston miracle’; Operation 
Ceasefire. This was an earlier ‘pulling levers’ 
intervention that brought together a partnership 
of the police and local community organisations. 
They presented local violent youths with a clear 
choice – avoid violence and accept help with 
Box 3: Rio de Janeiro’s ‘Pacifying Police Units’ (UPP)
Rio de Janeiro has a long history of violence associated with drugs, organised crime and 
police repression. In Rio, the drug trade remains concentrated within economically and 
socially vulnerable communities living in the city’s favelas (slums). In the 1970s, Rio became 
an important transit point for cocaine exports to North America, Europe and South Africa. 
Newly established drug factions quickly settled in the favelas, where they became important 
figures in the socio-political life of the community, providing them with health and social 
services and opportunities for employment in the drugs trade – services that were not offered 
by the government itself. In the 1980s and 1990s, divisions within and between drug factions, 
the increasing availability of high-calibre weapons, and violent police interventions in the 
favelas led to increasing levels of violence. High numbers of deaths (in 2010, the murder 
rate in Rio reached 46 per 100,000 inhabitants), an overcrowding of Brazilian prisons with 
drug offenders, high levels of corruption, and an ever-expanding drug market led the local 
government in Rio to review its drug policy.
 
Launched in 2008 in the favela of Santa Marta, UPPs (‘Unidades de Policía Pacificadora’, 
Pacifying Police Units) reflect a new public security policy that combines law enforcement 
with actions seeking to tackle the social, economic and cultural aspects of the drug market. 
A key element of this policy is that it should focus on those areas where the market is most 
harmful, while acknowledging that some level of trafficking will be tolerated elsewhere. The 
pacification process consists of four steps:
•	 invasion: this step aims to retake control of the territories under the influence of a drug 
‘cartel’; it involves the intervention of the military 
•	 stabilisation: while in the past the military has been used to invade problematic favelas 
only to withdraw a few hours later, this new strategy entails that the military remain in the 
pacified territory until the UPPs take over 
education and employment, or go to prison 
immediately. Initial reductions in violence were 
dramatic and well-publicised. Less well known 
is the fact that violence bounced back when the 
partnership broke down due to the departure 
of its police coordinator and conflict between 
members.49 Nevertheless, aspects of Operation 
Ceasefire influenced the development of 
targeted deterrence schemes in other parts 
of the world, notably Brazil; although there as 
well, the approach has not been without its 
downsides (see Box 3).
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A recent review of experimental evaluations of 
focused deterrence approaches has found that 
they do tend to produce reductions in crime, 
but that more research is necessary into the 
dynamics, transferability and sustainability of 
these reductions.51 
Implementation, evaluation and 
austerity
In their review of the effectiveness of drug 
law enforcement interventions, Mazerolle et 
al52 suggested a hierarchy of effectiveness of 
different policing approaches. At the bottom of 
this hierarchy, they placed generic, unfocused 
police patrols, which have not been shown 
to have a substantial effect in reducing drug 
markets or their harms. Then came community 
wide approaches involving a range of partners, 
which have some evidence of effect, but not as 
much as more specifically targeted approaches, 
such as place-based ‘hotspot’ policing. This 
has some evidence of producing reductions in 
drug and other crimes, but these tend not to be 
sustained when the targeted policing resources 
are withdrawn (and they may produce some of 
the harms discussed above). At the highest 
level of their hierarchy, Mazerolle et al placed 
interventions that combine a problem-
oriented, geographical targeting with efforts 
to create and sustain partnerships of agencies 
and actors (including local landlords) which 
can help to sustain reductions in drug markets 
and related harms.
In 2009, the UK Drug Policy Commission 
(UKDPC) found some evidence that police 
services in the UK have been learning the 
lessons of the research which Mazerolle et 
al reviewed. The UKDPC’s report53 includes 
a number of case studies which show the 
adoption of problem-oriented, place-focused, 
partnership-led operations. One example is 
Operation Reduction in Brighton. This runs 
in eight week phases, with intelligence being 
gathered in local drug markets through test 
purchasing to identify drug dealers who are 
causing the highest levels of harm through 
dealing and other crimes. This is followed by an 
arrest phase in which arrestees are encouraged 
to enter the drug treatment programmes that 
are made available to them. This has been 
evaluated as successful in reducing acquisitive 
•	 occupation: the UPPs start to operate in the favelas and seek to restore the rule of law 
through a system of community policing 
•	 post-occupation: the UPPs develop a strong relationship of trust with the community and 
establish socio-economic programmes to boost education and employment opportunities. 
Between  2008 and 2012, 17 favelas were  retaken by the UPPs. Several concerns have 
been  raised about the policy, however. First, some have criticised a feeling of militarisation 
of the communities, with the military remaining in the favelas for an extended period of time, 
leading to tight police control, arbitrary search and seizures and harassment. Others have 
raised concerns about the capacity of the UPPs to tackle drug-related violence extensively. 
Indeed, out of the 1,000 favelas in the city, only 17 have been pacified so far. This may lead 
organised criminal groups to migrate to those neighbouring favelas that have not yet been 
pacified and resume their violent activities. Nevertheless, the UPPs have been well received 
by favela residents. A study in eight pacified favelas found that 83 per cent of the residents 
considered that their security situation had improved as a result of the programme.50
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crime in the area, and particularly among the 
individuals who were arrested. Similar claims 
have been published about Operation Iceberg in 
Kent and Operation Brava in Leeds. It is highly 
plausible, given the known successes of the 
‘pulling levers’ approach – and of drug treatment 
in reducing offending – that these programmes 
reduced some forms of offending. However, it 
is regrettable that their evaluations have not 
included adequate control groups or systematic 
analysis of potential unintended consequences 
on violence and public health. The UKDPC 
report, for example, notes that there were initial 
problems in Operation Reduction with a group 
of dealers who replaced arrestees. These new 
dealers offered higher purity heroin which 
produced a short-term spike in overdose deaths 
(until these dealers were themselves arrested). 
A report by the evaluators of Operation 
Reduction suggested that the evaluation of such 
initiatives can be costed at about £20,000.54 
Unfortunately, it costs much more than this to 
produce robust and comprehensive analysis of 
the effects of police operations on the full range 
of drug market harms. However, the failure to 
invest in such rigorous evaluation means that 
we are probably wasting much larger sums on 
programmes that are not effective, or that are 
actively counter-productive.55  
The resources available for the policing of 
British drug markets (as for all other areas 
of public service) are under severe pressure. 
Another UKDPC report56 found that a majority 
of polled police services expected to reduce 
their spending on the policing of drug markets. 
Intelligence gathering operations (of the type 
necessary for pulling levers) were considered 
particularly vulnerable. Police services also 
knew that potential partners across the public 
sector also had to reconsider the resources that 
they devote to partnership working. The need to 
follow the governmental mantra of doing ‘more 
for less’ is particularly acute in the policing of 
drug markets. There is an opportunity to do less 
of the things that are expensive and potentially 
counter-productive (e.g. unfocused patrolling, 
large-scale stop and search, numerous arrests 
of PWUDs, short-term crackdowns on dealers) 
and more of the things that provide value for the 
police and partners in health and local authorities. 
This would include maintaining and developing 
investment in operations that force the drug 
market to adopt less visible and harmful forms, 
working with partners (including landlords) to 
shape the social context of local drug markets 
and continuing to divert people dependent on 
drugs into cost-effective treatment. In an age 
where the police are having to scale back their 
numbers, it becomes increasingly important 
that their resources are spent effectively and 
that they act in ways that boost their legitimacy 
and thereby the non-coerced law abidance of 
local citizens.
Conclusions and 
recommendations
The police provide a crucial service to the 
public in reducing the harms of crime. This 
report has explored how this service can be 
enhanced. This involves avoiding practices 
which tend to produce crime and other harms. 
It also involves adopting tactics that have the 
best chance of reducing the harms associated 
with drug markets.
The police in many countries have learnt that a 
blanket approach which aims to eliminate drug 
markets is not feasible. Not all drug markets are 
equal in terms of the harms they produce. And 
untargeted, enforcement-only approaches are 
unlikely to produce sustainable reductions in either 
the scale of the drug markets or level of harms.
Below is a list of recommendations for 
consideration by policy makers and senior 
police officers who are designing and managing 
the policing of retail drug markets.
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1. There should be increased recognition that 
the level of harm is more important than the 
size of the market.
2. Police services and policy makers should 
use tactics that are experienced by the 
community as being fair, lawful and 
effective. Otherwise, they will harm police 
legitimacy and community relations.
3. Policies and strategies should recognise 
that visible, open air drug markets tend to 
be more harmful per unit of use than hidden, 
closed drug markets.
4. There should be increased appreciation 
that some enforcement-led approaches, 
including short-term crackdowns and 
large scale stop and search, are unlikely 
to produce sustainable reductions in drug 
sales. They may actually increase levels 
of violence and health harms and reduce 
police legitimacy.
5. That policing tactics can force the drug 
market to adopt less harmful forms should 
be embraced and foregrounded in the 
design and implementation of anti-drug 
approaches
6. Policing of drug markets should be 
designed in order to minimise opportunities 
for corruption 
7. Potentially effective tactics include 
decriminalisation/depenalisation, ‘pulling 
levers’, focused deterrence, diversion to 
treatment and other problem-oriented, 
partnership approaches.
8. In an age of austerity, it is necessary to 
concentrate resources on policing tactics 
which have the greatest chance of delivering 
both community safety and value to the 
taxpayer.
9. More research is needed to ascertain which 
tactics are likely to be most effective in which 
local and national contexts. Failure to invest 
in robust evaluation is a false economy.
Modernising Drug Law Enforcement 
A project by IDPC, with the participation of the International Security Research Department 
at Chatham House and the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Drug law enforcement has traditionally focused on reducing the size of the illicit drug market by 
seeking to eradicate drug production, distribution and retail supply, or at least on the stifling of these 
activities to an extent that potential consumers are unable to get access to particular drugs.
These strategies have failed to reduce the supply of, or demand for, drugs in consumer markets. 
Given this reality, and a wider policy context where some governments are moving away from a ‘war 
on drugs’ approach, drug law enforcement strategies need to be adjusted to fit the new challenge 
– to manage drug markets in a way that minimises harms on communities. A recognition that law 
enforcement powers can be used to beneficially shape, rather than entirely eradicate, drug markets 
is being increasingly discussed.
The objective of this project, led by IDPC, with the participation of the International Security Re-
search Department at Chatham House and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is to col-
late and refine theoretical material and examples of new approaches to drug law enforcement, as 
well as to promote debate amongst law enforcement leaders on the implications for future strat-
egies.101 For more information, see: http://idpc.net/policy-advocacy/special-projects/modernis-
ing-drug-law-enforcement.
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